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Abstract— We pose an active perception problem where
an autonomous agent actively interacts with a second agent
with potentially adversarial behaviors. Given the uncertainty
in the intent of the other agent, the objective is to collect
further evidence to help discriminate potential threats. The
main technical challenges are the partial observability of the
agent intent, the adversary modeling, and the corresponding
uncertainty modeling. Note that an adversary agent may act to
mislead the autonomous agent by using a deceptive strategy that
is learned from past experiences. We propose an approach that
combines belief space planning, generative adversary modeling,
and maximum entropy reinforcement learning to obtain a
stochastic belief space policy. By accounting for various adver-
sarial behaviors in the simulation framework and minimizing
the predictability of the autonomous agent’s action, the resulting
policy is more robust to unmodeled adversarial strategies. This
improved robustness is empirically shown against an adversary
that adapts to and exploits the autonomous agent’s policy
when compared with a standard Chance-Constraint Partially
Observable Markov Decision Process robust approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are interested in an active perception problem, where
an autonomous agent interacts with a second agent (which
we refer to as the opponent in the following context), whose
intention is unknown. The objective is evidence accumulation
to help identify the intent of the opponent. In order to
achieve this goal while ensuring safety, the autonomous
agent has to reason about the possible reactions of the
opponent in response to its exploring actions and maximize
the information gained from this interaction. This type of
problem can find applications in various domains such as
urban security and humanitarian assistance.
One field of research closely related to our work is
Threat Assessment (TA). One approach to TA is Adversarial
Intention Recognition (AIR), i.e., recognizing the intentions
of a potential adversary based on the observations of its
actions and states. Early works in AIR rely on a library
of adversarial plans [1], [2], explicitly encoding a set of
expected adversarial behaviors. This approach could suffer
from incompleteness of the behavior library. Most recent
advancements in AIR use a two-phase approach combining
generative plan recognition and game theoretic planning [3],
[4], [5]. In the first phase, a probability distribution over the
potential intentions of the adversary is inferred by solving an
inverse planning problem given an agent action model and
a set of possible intentions. In the second phase, a set of
stochastic games, each corresponding to one specific hostile
intention, are solved, and the Nash Equilibrium policy is
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Fig. 1: Illustration of the active perception challenge: The au-
tonomous agent wants to infer the intention of the opponent,
while accounting for its possible deceptive behaviors.
obtained as the best response to the adversary. This existing
framework, however, does not account for adversarial strate-
gies that are actively against the intention recognition, e.g.,
deceptive behaviors.
Our active perception problem differs from the AIR prob-
lem in that: 1) the opponent is not necessarily adversarial,
but could be self-interested; and 2) the primary objective
is discriminating potential threat through evidence accu-
mulation rather than defending against adversarial attacks.
Despite these subtle differences, these two problems share
the same challenge of reasoning about the hidden intention
(partial observability) of the potential adversary subject to
the modeling uncertainty of the opponent behavior, which is
illustrated in Fig. 1. Therefore, we expect that the techniques
in our approach are also applicable to AIR problems.
Belief space planning provides a principled framework to
perform optimally in a partially observable world. Gener-
ative adversary modeling provides a variety of adversarial
behaviors against which the autonomous agent can optimize
its policy so that robustness is gained. This also avoids
the requirements of domain experts and the difficulty of
handcrafting a library of adversary behaviors. Reinforcement
learning makes it possible to learn a policy from a black-box
simulator that represents a complicated mixture of behaviors,
which could be difficult in planning-based approaches. The
maximum entropy framework minimizes the exploitability
of the resulted policy by minimizing the predictability of
the actions, thus making it more robust to un-modeled
adversarial strategies.
To summarize, the contribution here is the development of
a scalable robust active perception method in scenarios where
a potential adversary opponent could be actively hostile to the
intent recognition activity, which extends and outperforms
the POMDP methods.
II. RELATED WORKS
We review three related fields of research:
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1) POMDP: finds a deterministic optimal policy in a par-
tially observable scenario given a reasonably accurate
agent model;
2) Game theory: finds robust Nash Equilibrium policies
given a payoff (reward) profile encoding the preference
(dictated by the intent) of the agents, without the
requirement of an agent model;
3) Deep reinforcement learning: enables learning an op-
timal policy from a simulator, the building block that
our work is based on.
A. POMDP frameworks
The POMDP framework provides a principled approach
to behave optimally in a partially observable environment.
One restriction of this framework is that it assumes a
fixed reactive probabilistic model of the opponent, implying
stationary behavior without rationality. To mitigate perfor-
mance degradation due to modeling uncertainty, existing ap-
proaches include Bayesian-Adaptive POMDP (BA-POMDP)
[6], [7], robust POMDP [8], Chance-constrained POMDP
(CC-POMDP) [9], and Interactive-POMDP (I-POMDP) [10].
BA-POMDP augments the state space with a state tran-
sition count and a state observation count variables as
additional hidden states [6], [7]. It maintains a belief over
the augmented state space, resulting in an optimal trade-off
between model learning and reward collecting. An implicit
assumption of this approach is that the unknown POMDP
model is either fixed or varying slower than the model
learning process, which is unlikely to be applicable to active
perception where an adversary opponent might be learning
and adapting too.
An alternative approach is to find a robust policy, which
does not assume a fixed model. Robust POMDP assumes
the true transition and observation probability belongs to a
bounded uncertainty set, and optimizes the policy for the
worst case [8].
CC-POMDP finds an optimal deterministic policy that
satisfies chance constraints. This formulation results in a
better trade-off between robustness and nominal performance
than Robust POMDP. While this formulation shows promis-
ing results in challenging risk-sensitive applications [9],
we argue that the class of uncertainty considered in the
CC-POMDP formulation might be too restrictive for our
application. However, a better framework that utilizes a wide
class of adversary model to find a stochastic optimal policy
should exhibit better robustness against an adversary.
I-POMDP extends the POMDP framework by augmenting
the hidden space of each agent with a type attribute. The type
attribute of an agent includes its preference and belief. The
agents reason about the types of the other agents, resulting
in nested beliefs. The issue with this approach is that the
type space is so large that inference becomes computationally
intractable [10]. In practice, a finite set of possible models
for each agent is assumed, which makes it suffer from the
difficulty of model incompleteness.
B. Game theoretic frameworks
The POMDP framework simplifies the active perception
problem into a single-agent planning problem. An alternative
multi-agent view of this problem is a Bayesian game, where
the autonomous agent is unsure about the identity of the
Fig. 2: Anticipated correlation between model uncertainty
and performances of different active perception algorithms
(some evidence shown in Fig. 4). While POMDP is optimal
given an accurate model, it might be sensitive to model
uncertainty. Nash Equilibrium should be robust to model
uncertainty, but it might sacrifice too much nominal perfor-
mance when a good model is available.
opponent. In such a problem, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
strategies are the optimal solutions. Regret Minimization
(RM) [11] and Fictitious Play (FP) [12] are two algorithmic
frameworks for finding Nash Equilibriums. Recent exten-
sions of these two frameworks with deep neural networks
achieved success in imperfect information zero-sum games
[13], [14]. One significant advantage of this framework over
POMDP is that no agent model is explicitly required. Instead,
the opponent behavior is implicitly specified by the joint
payoff (reward), assuming rationality. The Nash Equilibrium
policy is a robust solution in the sense that it is the best
response to a perfect opponent. In reality, however, the
opponent could be of bounded rationality and reasoning ca-
pability, which is non-trivial to model in this game theoretic
framework. Moreover, we often have a strong prior over
the probable opponent behaviors, while the game theoretic
approach completely neglects this knowledge. We expect
that algorithms exploiting a reasonable opponent model can
outperform the Nash Equilibrium in both the nominal and
mildly off-nominal cases. Moreover, convergence of RM
and FP in general-sum two-player games is not established,
making it difficult to apply these techniques to our active
perception problem, since the opponent is not necessarily
adversarial, but could be indifferent (e.g., neutral).
Based on the above discussions, we anticipate a corre-
lation between model uncertainty and the performance of
different classes of algorithms, as illustrated in Fig. 2. A
desired solution should be near optimal given a good model,
and degrades gracefully with respect to increasing model
uncertainty.
C. Deep reinforcement learning
Deep reinforcement learning has led to several recent
breakthroughs to solving difficult problems in both MDP
[15], [16] and POMDP [17], [18] domains, single and
multi-agent [19], [20], [21] domains. The difficulty of deep
reinforcement learning in multi-agent domain stems from the
non-stationarity of the perceived environment dynamics due
to the learning process of other agents. This non-stationarity
destablizes value function based methods and causes high
variance for policy based methods [22]. A lot of recent works
focus on developing learning algorithms that converge in
this multi-agent setting, [19], [23], [24], while few works
have been done on agent modeling [25]. We argue that it
is crucial to model the opponent in our active perception
problem, because otherwise it becomes challenging, if not
impossible, to define exploring behavior. Another benefit of
maintaining a model is that the action observation history can
be compactly summarized into a belief state, which retains
the Markovian property even in partially observable settings.
This Markovian property is crucial to the convergence of
many reinforcement learning algorithms.
III. APPROACH
In this section, we describe our algorithm to address
the perceived challenges, i.e., active perception robust to
un-modeled adversarial strategies. We first formalize the
problem description and list the assumptions we make. We
then give a general description of our algorithm followed by
the implementation detail.
We model the active perception problem as a planning
problem, defined by the tuple 〈S,Aa, Ao, T,O,R, b0, γ〉,
where S = 〈So, Sp〉 is the state of the world, consisting
of the set of observable states So and the set of partially
observable states Sp; Aa is the set of actions of the au-
tonomous agent; Ao is the set of actions of the opponent;
we further assume that regardless of the intention, the
opponent has the same set of observable actions. Otherwise,
an intention is easily identifiable once an action that is
uniquely corresponding to that type of intention is observed.
T : S × Aa × Ao → ∆S is the transition probability, where
∆• denotes the space of probability distribution over the
space •. O : S × Aa → ∆Ao is the observation probability;
R : S×Aa×Ao → R is the reward function; b0 is the prior
probability of the opponent being an adversary; and γ is the
discount factor.
We make the following modeling assumptions:
1) The opponent is either a neutral or an adversary with
hostile intents.
2) A neutral opponent is self-interested, whose behavior
can be modeled by a reactive policy pineu(aot |st).
3) A hostile opponent is primarily goal-directed, which is
defined by a known MDP.
4) A hostile opponent is of bounded rationality, implying
that it might not be able to always take the optimal
action; moreover, it is likely to behave deceptively in
order to achieve its goal.
We also assume that a reasonably accurate neutral behavior
model is available. We then generate a parametric set of
hostile models with two parameters representing the level of
rationality and the level of deception, respectively. We use a
feed-forward neural network (NN) to represent the policy of
the autonomous agent. This NN takes a binary belief state
as its input, which is obtained from Bayesian filtering the
hidden intention based on an average model. The output
is a stochastic policy. The reward function is composed
of a belief dependent reward, which encourages exploring
behavior, and a state dependent reward, which ensures safety.
In order to minimize the exploitability, we apply the soft-
Q learning [26] algorithm that learns a maximum entropy
policy.
We present the detail on agent modeling, belief space
reward and policy learning in the following subsections.
A. Opponent modeling
We use a binary variable λ ∈ {0, 1} to denote whether
the opponent is a neutral or an adversary with hostile intents.
Depending on λ, the opponent is expected to exhibit different
behaviors, which is fully described by an opponent policy
pio(aot |st). This model is restrictive since the action proba-
bility only depend on the current state. Nonetheless, we use
this model only for policy learning, and use a general history
dependent opponent policy for the evaluation of the learned
autonomous agent policy. Another implicit assumption of this
model is that the opponent has full observability over the
states. This assumption could be released by modeling the
opponent as a POMDP agent.
Neutral model: If the opponent is a neutral, i.e. λ = 0, we
assume a simple reactive policy pineu(aot |st) is available to
model the opponent:
pio(aot |st, λ = 0) = pineu(aot |st). (1)
Adversary model: We use the following equation to model
an adversarial agent’s policy pio:
pio(aot |st, λ = 1;α, β) =argminpi∈∆{KL(pi|piMDPα )
+ βKL(pi|pio(·|st, λ = 0))},
(2)
piMDPα (a
o
t |st, λ = 1) = eαQ(st,a
o
t )/Z(st), (3)
where KL(·|·) denotes the Kullback–Leibler divergence be-
tween two distributions, The goal-achieving policy piMDPα is
associated with the optimal Q function Q(st, aot ), of a goal-
achieving adversary MDP defined later. The temperature
parameter α in (3) represents the level of rationality of
the adversary. The other parameter β indicates the level of
deception. Z(st) is the partition function that normalizes
piMDPα .
We assume that the goal-directed behavior can be modeled
by a known adversary MDP 〈So, Ao, T,Ro, γo〉, where So =
S × Aa is the state space of the active perception problem
augmented by the action space of the autonomous agent. This
implies that if the autonomous agent takes different actions,
the opponent will be in different MDP states, even though
the world space S is the same, allowing the opponent taking
different responses. Ao, the action space of the adversary
MDP, is the same as that of the active perception problem,
and so is the transition probability T . The reward function
Ro specifies the reward for the adversary MDP, which is
different from that of the active perception. γo is the discount
factor, which could be different from γ.The interpretation of
(2) and (3) is: the adversary policy is a balance between the
goal-achieving actions corresponding to the adversary MDP
(first term in (2)) and the deceptive actions by imitating the
neutral policy (second term in (2)). By varying the two hyper-
parameters α and β, we obtain a set of policies describing a
variety of adversary behaviors, which is expected to make the
optimized active perception policy more robust. Therefore,
we assume a uniform hyper-prior over these two hyper-
parameter:
p(α, β) =
{
1 if 1 ≤ α ≤ 2, 1 ≤ β ≤ 2;
0 otherwise.
(4)
B. Belief space reward
We maintain a belief bt(λ) over the hidden variable by
Bayesian filtering. This requires both models for the neutral
and the adversary. The neutral model is given by Eq. 1. As
the adversary model includes two continuous parameters,
inference over the joint space of λ, α, β is expensive and
might not be helpful because this handcraft model may not
match the real adversary behavior. We use an average model
by marginalizing out the hyper-parameters
p¯io(aot |st, λ = 1) =
∫∫
pio(aot |st, λ = 1;α, β)p(α, β)dαdβ.
(5)
With (1) and (5), the Bayesian update rule for the belief
is well defined. We define a hybrid belief-state dependent
reward to balance exploration and safety
r(bt, st, a
a
t ) = −H(bt) + r(st, aat )
= b log b+ (1− b) log(1− b) + r(st, aat ),
(6)
where we use the shorthand b to denote bt(λ = 1), the
belief that the opponent is an adversary; and r(st, aat ) is the
state dependent reward. This reward (6) balances exploration
behavior and safety. The negative entropy reward −H(bt)
can be interpreted as maximizing the expected logarithm of
true positive rate (TPR) and true negative rate (TNR). The
state-dependent reward r(st, aat ) is used to ensure safety. For
instance, some actions could be dangerous to the neutral,
which are discouraged by a large negative reward.
C. Policy learning
We use soft-Q learning [26] to learn a stochastic belief
space policy. The soft-Q learning objective is to maximize
the expected reward regularized by the entropy of the policy,∑
t
Ebt,st,at∼ρpiγt[r(bt, st, at) + σH(pi(·|bt, st))]. (7)
The parameter σ controls the ‘softness’ of the policy. The
nice interpretation of this objective function is maximizing
accumulative reward while behaving as uncertain as possible,
which is a desired property against an adversary.
This maximum entropy problem is solved using soft-Q
iteration. For discrete action space, the fixed point iteration:
Qsoft(bt, st, at)← rt + γEbt+1,st+1∼ps [Vsoft(bt+1, st+1)],
(8)
Vsoft(bt, st)← σ log
∑
a∈A
exp(
1
σ
Qsoft(bt, st, a)), (9)
converges to the optimal soft value functions Q∗soft and V
∗
soft
[26], and the optimal policy can be obtained from:
pi∗MaxEnt(at|bt, st) = exp(
1
σ
(Q∗soft(bt, st, at)− V ∗soft(bt, st))).
(10)
D. Implementation detail
In order to stabilize the training of the soft value functions,
a separate target value network is used, whose parameter is
an exponential moving average of that of the value network,
with average coefficient τ = 0.01. During the training, the
value at the right hand side of (8) is replaced by the value
of the target value function.
Algorithm 1 Soft-Q learning for active perception
B=[] #initialize the experience replay buffer
SQNN.initialize() #initialize the soft Q networks
for n = 1;n ≤ N ;n = n+ 1 do
λ ∼ Bernoulli(b0)
if λ = 0 then
pio ← pineu #neutral policy
else
α, β ∼ p(α, β) #adversary hyper-parameter
pio ←RHS of (2) #adversary policy
end if
B.append(SQNN.simulate(pio))
SQNN.train(B.sample())
end for
We use two feedforward neural networks to parametrize
the soft Q function and the soft value function. Each neural
network has three fully connected hidden layers with 64,
128, and 64 hidden units, respectively, followed by the Relu
nonlinear activation function. We use L1 loss and Adam
stochastic optimizer with learning rate lr = 5 × 10−4 for
the value function training. We use a batch size of 50, and
an experience replay buffer of size 106, with 105 training
epochs. We tested different entropy parameter σ, and selected
σ = 0.25. This value leads to both stable training and decent
performance. The pipeline of our algorithm is summarized
by the pseudo code in Algorithm 1.
IV. CASE STUDY: THREAT DISCRIMINATION AT A
CHECKPOINT
A. Problem description
We evaluate our algorithm via a simple threat discrimina-
tion scenario at a checkpoint. In this scenario, an autonomous
agent wants to identify if an oncoming opponent is a neutral
or an adversary.
States: The states consist of the fully observable physical
state: the distance of the opponent from the checkpoint dt,
and the binary hidden state of the opponent, λ, indicating
neutral or adversary.
Actions and observations: At each time instance, the au-
tonomous agent is allowed to take one action from three
possible actions: (1) Send a hand signal, (2) Use a loud-
speaker, (3) Use a flare bang. The opponent has two possible
reactions at each time instance: (1) Stay at the same place
(2) Continue proceeding towards to checkpoint.
State transition: None of the three actions of the au-
tonomous agent has direct effects on the opponent state,
while the response of the opponent to these actions are
different in the probabilistic sense. If the opponent takes
the first action (stay), then its distance from the checkpoint
does not change; otherwise, if the opponent takes the second
action (proceed), the distance decreases by a unit distance:
dt+1 =
{
dt a
o
t = stay;
dt − 1 aot = proceed.
(11)
State dependent reward: The state dependent reward for
the autonomous agent (r(s, aa) in (6)) is shown in Table II.
Any actions taken upon a neutral is penalized. Aggressive
actions (such as flare bang) are penalized more heavily than
conservative actions (such as hand signal).
Initial and terminal conditions: Initially, the opponent is
12 unit distance away from the checkpoint, d0 = 12. The
autonomous agent and the opponent take turns making their
actions for 10 rounds, with the autonomous agent taking its
action first. This interaction terminates at the 10-th round,
i.e., T = 10.
Opponent agent model:
Neutral: A neutral responds reactively to the actions taken
by the autonomous agent, according to the probability shown
in Table I.
Adversary: The primary goal of an adversarial opponent
is to get close to the checkpoint as quick as possible to
conduct a malicious attack. We use the following dense
reward for the adversary, which increases as the distance
from the checkpoint decreases:
rMDP = 1.1d0−d − 1. (12)
We choose γo = γ = 0.95. The adversary policy is
determined by (2), (3), and (12) together.
B. Baseline
We compare our algorithm with a planning based baseline
algorithm, CC-POMDP. In this framework, the observation
probabilities of the POMDP model are assumed to be
drawn from a probability distribution. The optimal policy
is computed such that the corresponding value function is
guaranteed to be higher than a maximized threshold with a
certain (high) probability. Formally, the CC-POMDP optimal
value function can be found by the iteration
Vn+1(b) = max
aa∈Aa
[r(b, s, aa) + V˜ (aa)], (13)
where V˜ (aa) is obtained from the chance constraint opti-
mization problem
max
aa∈Aa
V˜ ,
s.t. Ppio∼ppi [γ
∑
s∈S
b(s)
∑
ao∈Ao
pio(ao|s, aa)Vn(b′b,aa,ao) > V˜ ]
> 1− , (14)
where n is the iteration index. pio is the modeled observa-
tion probability. ppi is the probability distribution over the
observation probability. b′b,aa,ao is the updated belief from
the belief state b, after taking the action aa and observing
the reaction ao. 0 ≤  ≤ 1 is a confidence bound, which
typically takes a small value. We choose  = 0.05, as this
results in the best performance.
In order to solve the chance constraint optimization, the
probability distribution ppi , over the observation probability
parameters pio needs to be specified. We model these proba-
bility parameters as uncorrelated Gaussian random variables
with the nominal probability parameters determined by Eq. 1
(with Table I), 2, 3, 12 as their mean values. We choose the
variance of these Gaussian variables to be var(pio) = 0.001.
C. Evaluation criterion
In order to evaluate the robustness of the active perception
policy against un-modeled adversarial behaviors, we test the
TABLE I: Observation probability of a neutral’s reaction
Action/Reaction Stay Proceed
Hand 0.60 0.40
Loudspeaker 0.75 0.25
Flare 0.90 0.10
TABLE II: State dependent reward for active perception
agent
Action/State Neutral Adversary
Hand -0.1 0
Loudspeaker -0.3 0
Flare -0.7 0
performance on two adversary models that have not been
presented in the training phase:
Learning adversary: In the first testing adversary model,
we apply the soft-Q learning algorithm to train an adversary
policy with the following adversary reward
radv = −r(b, s, aa) + ηrMDP, (15)
where the self-interest parameter η ∈ [0,+∞) controls the
degree of self-interest, and its inverse 1η can be interpreted
as the degree of adversary. We choose different values of
η in the range [0, 5], with step size ∆η = 0.25. We favor
the adversary by rendering him the access to the internal
belief state of the autonomous agent. The adversary policy
network takes this belief state, the immediate action taken
by the autonomous agent and the observable distance from
the checkpoint, outputting a probability distribution over its
two available actions. We define the following two criteria to
evaluate the performance of the active perception algorithms
1) Accumulated active perception loss:
Clap = −E[∑Tt=0 γtrt]
2) True positive rate (TPR):
TPR = E[bt=T |λ = 1]
Deceptive adversary: In the second testing adversary
model, we handcraft a deceptive strategy. A deceptive adver-
sary uses the following policy when the autonomous agent
takes actions hand or loudspeaker:
ao =
{
stop bt > bThre;
proceed bt ≤ bThre, (16)
while only when the autonomous agent takes action flare,
the adversary takes action proceed. bThre is a free parameter
that controls how deceptive the adversary is. We choose bThre
in the range [0, 0.5], with step size ∆bThre = 0.025.
These two adversary models are not present in the learning
phase. The active perception agent has to identify the hidden
intent while being robust to this model uncertainty, which is
challenging.
D. Results
Against a learning adversary: We present the perfor-
mance criteria against a learning adversary in Fig. 3a and 3b.
These results are averaged over 10 learning simulations. Our
algorithm shows better performance compared with the CC-
POMDP baseline over the whole range of the self-interest
(a) Accumulated active perception loss
Clap against learning adversary
(b) True positive rate (TPR) against
learning adversary
(c) True positive rate (TPR) against de-
ceptive adversary
Fig. 3: Comparisons of two performance criteria between our proposed algorithm and CC-POMDP, against both a learning
adversary ((a) and (b)) parametrized by the self-interest parameter η and a deceptive adversary (in (c)) parametrized by bThre:
a small η indicates high degree of adversary, and a small bThre indicates high degree of deception; Low Clap and high TPR
are desired.
Fig. 4: Correlation between the adversary model uncertainty
and the difference in performance between our algorithm
and CC-POMDP: In general, a large policy uncertainty index
corresponds to a large difference.
parameter η, despite the small difference. This is likely
attributed to the ensemble modeling used in our algorithm,
which results in better robustness against model uncertainty.
Nonetheless, planning against an ensemble model is difficult
to formulate in the POMDP framework.
Against a deceptive adversary: We present the TPR
against a deceptive adversary in Fig. 3c. The deterministic
CC-POMDP policy achieves significantly lower TPR than
the stochastic soft-Q learning policy does. As the CC-
POMDP policy deterministically selects action hand when
the belief is lower than some threshold, selects loudspeaker
otherwise, and never selects flare, the deceptive adversary
can maneuver this belief state by exploiting this determin-
istic structure. In contrast, since the soft-Q learning agent
uses a maximum entropy stochastic policy, the adversary’s
maneuvering strategy becomes less effective.
We anticipate that the difference in performance between
our algorithm and CC-POMDP is correlated with the adver-
sary model uncertainty, as illustrated in Fig. 2. We provide
some evidence to justify this speculation in Fig. 4. We
defined a policy uncertainty index up, as one metric to
quantify the deviation of the actual adversary policy from
the assumed one
up =
∑
aa∈Aa
∑
s∈S
T∑
t=1
Nˆs,aa,t
NˆMˆ
KL[pˆi(ao|s, aa, t)|pi(ao|s, aa, t)],
(17)
where pˆi is an empirical estimation of the adversary policy
from data tuples (ao, s, aa, t) collected in simulations. pi is
the nominal adversary policy defined in Eq. 2. Nˆs,aa,t is the
number of counts that (•, s, aa, t) appears in the data, where
• represents any value for ao. Nˆ = ∑s,aa,t Nˆs,aa,t is the
total number of data tuples; and Mˆ is the total number of
different data tuples (•, s, aa, t) appearring in simulations.
Fig. 4 shows that, generally speaking, a large model
uncertainty corresponds to a large difference in performance.
This observation explains the small difference between our
algorithm and CC-POMDP against the learning adversary
shown in Fig. 3a and 3b, and the large difference against the
deceptive adversary shown in Fig. 3c. It also suggests that our
algorithm has the desired property illustrated in Fig. 2, which
might be a better trade-off between nominal and off-nominal
performance than both POMDP and Nash Equilibrium.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we pose an active perception problem against
an opponent with uncertain intent and potential adversar-
ial behaviors. We reviewed related fields of research and
pointed out the gap between the existing approaches and
the desired solution properties. We then presented a novel
solution combining generative adversary modeling, belief
space planning, and maximum entropy deep reinforcement
learning. Compared with a CC-POMDP baseline, the pro-
posed algorithm is more robust to un-modeled adversarial
strategies. One limitation of this work is that we still need
to specify an opponent behavior model, which could be
non-trivial in complicated applications. We are developing
learning algorithms that learn a reasonable opponent model
through self-play, to address this limitation.
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